The current reform to the Federal Judicial Branch has its origins in the proposal presented on February 5^th, 2024, by the head of the Federal Executive Branch, in a desperate effort to change the Mexican judicial system through substantial modifications to the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, representing an unprecedented change in the country’s history. 

After months of debate, the initiative was approved in the Senate of the Republic on September 11^th, 2024, with 86 votes in favor, just the minimum required for the approval of the constitutional reform.  This result  was due to an unexpected, qualified majority,  amidst of intense protests, accusations of political coercion and multiple criticisms from national and international legal forums regarding the content and scope of the reform.

Finally, on September 15^th, 2024, the decree enacting the reform of the Federal Judicial Branch was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation.  This decree includes a restructuring of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (“SCJN”), the introduction of new mechanisms for the selection of judges and magistrates, the creation of new administrative and disciplinary bodies, among other measures.  The publication can be consulted here.

Some of the most relevant changes are as follows:

1. Popular election of ministers and judges.  The ministers of the SCJN, as well as federal magistrates and judges will be elected by direct popular vote.  The election will be organized by the National Electoral Institute and will take place in stages, starting with ordinary elections in June 2025 , followed by elections in 2027.  Some relevant points to consider are:
   • a) Not all judges and magistrates will be elected at the same time, but in different phases to avoid gaps in the administration of justice.
   • b)  The proposal includes mechanisms to ensure continuity of the current officeholders, allowing sitting judges and magistrates to run for reelection without undergoing additional evaluations.
2. Reduction of the term of office.  The term of office for SCJN justices will be reduced from 15 to 12 years.  The right to receive a retirement payment at the end of their term will also be eliminated, and the presidency will rotate every two years,  based on the number of votes each candidate receives in the respective election, with the presidency going to the candidate who obtains the most votes.
3. Elimination of the SCJN Chambers.  The SCJN’s 2 chambers are eliminated, and  all matters will be resolved by the Plenary.
4. Creation of new administrative and disciplinary bodies.  The Federal Judicial Council will be replaced by 2 new bodies: (i) a “judicial administration body” in charge of the administration of the Federal Judicial Branch, and (ii) the Court of Judicial Discipline, which will be in charge of the supervision and discipline of the Federal Judicial Branch, with very broad powers of disqualification and sanction.
5. Time limits for the resolution of matters.  In the case of tax matters, the federal courts will be obliged to resolve within a maximum term of 6 months, counted as of the date of knowledge of the matter.  In case of non-compliance, the Court of Judicial Discipline will have the authority to review the actions of the responsible judicial authorities.
6. Appointments and evaluations of candidates.  The 3 powers of the Union (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) will be able to nominate candidates for judicial positions. These candidates will be evaluated by technical committees, which will reduce the number of applicants through a selection process that includes public draw to ensure gender parity.
7. Campaigns without public or private funding.  Campaigns for the election of ministers, magistrates and judges will not receive public or private funding.  Candidates will have access to radio and television airtime, and may participate in debates organized by the National Electoral Institute.
8. Participation in forums and debates.  Candidates will be allowed to participate in debate forums organized by the National Electoral Institute or in media that offer this platform free of charge.

The decree marked the beginning of a 180-day transition period for the states, to implement of the structural modifications outlined in the reform, making the necessary adjustments to their local constitutions.  Specifically, the following dates must be taken into account for the implementation of the constitutional reform to the Judicial Power of the Federation:

1. September 15^th, 2024: Publication of the decree in the Official Gazette of the Federation.
2. September 16^th, 2024: Effective date of the constitutional reform and beginning of the extraordinary electoral process (2024-2025).
3. October 16^th, 2024: Deadline for the Senate of the Republic to issue a call for candidates.
4. December 15^th, 2024: Deadline for the Congress of the Union to amend secondary federal laws to specify details of the reform.
5. February 12^th, 2025: Deadline for the Senate of the Republic to send lists and nominations to the National Electoral Institute for the organization of the election.
6. March 15^th, 2025: Deadline for the states to adapt their respective local constitutions in accordance with the terms of the reform.
7. June 1^st, 2025: Date of the first elections.
8. September 1^st, 2025: Inauguration of officials elected by popular vote.

For Circuit Magistrates and District Judges, the election will be staggered, renewing half of the positions for each judicial circuit in the extraordinary election of 2025 and the remaining part in the ordinary federal election of 2027.

Despite these provisions, the reform of the Federal Judicial Branch has generated an intense debate, not only because of the changes it proposes, but also because of the potential for Mexico’s institutional balance.  Some of the most critical points are highlighted below, in light of fundamental constitutional principles such as the division of powers, judicial independence and the viability of a reform of this magnitude:

1. Violation of the principle of division of powers.  While the reform seeks greater efficiency in the administration of justice, critics point out that certain proposals would grant the Executive Branch greater interference in the Judicial Branch, which could unbalance the system of checks and balances essential to a functional democracy.  By allowing the Executive to pay a more direct role in the appointment of magistrates and judges, there is a risk that the independence of the Judicial Branch may be compromised, making it vulnerable to political pressure.
2. Threat to judicial autonomy and independence.  A cornerstone of any democratic judicial system is the independence of its judges and magistrates.  Critics warn that the reform could undermine this independence.  The possibility of establishing more centralized oversight mechanisms and the growing influence of the newly created bodies in the appointment and removal of judges (judicial administration body and the Court of Judicial Discipline) could, in practice, result in indirect control over judicial decisions.  Rather than strengthening autonomy, these changes could erode the basic principle that judges should act without fear of reprisal or external influence.
3. Material impossibility of carrying out a judicial selection of such magnitude.  The proposal to implement open elections for judges and magistrates, raises serious questions about its feasibility.  Mexico has a vast and complex judicial system and conducting a selection process of this magnitude could prove logistically unworkable.  Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure and clear mechanisms to ensure transparency and fairness in these processes makes this proposal extremely difficult to implement.  Even if implemented, there is a risk of politicizing judicial appointments, which would directly undermine judicial impartiality.
4. Risks of excessive centralization.  Another critical issue is the centralization of power in the newly created bodies (the judicial administration body and the Court of Judicial Discipline). Although these bodies are intended to function as oversight institutions, there is a risk that they could exert excessive control over the Judiciary.  The broad powers of the Court of Judicial Discipline, without clear checks on its decisions, could create a scenario in which the objective evaluation of judges and magistrates becomes difficult, opening the door to discretionary practices that diverge from the principle of impartial justice.
5. Negative impact on the financial independence of the Judiciary.  The centralization of resources and control over the judiciary’s budget could be used as tools to influence judicial decision-making.  This not only jeopardizes the autonomy of the SCJN and lower courts but could also undermine public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system.
6. Risk of politicization of justice.  By allowing judges and magistrates to be selected through processes influenced by the Executive or even through electoral mechanisms, there is a serious risk that judges will feel pressured to meet political or public expectations, rather than adhering to the Federal Constitution and legal framework.  This would jeopardize the impartiality and objectivity that are essential to a strong and independent judiciary.

In light of the above ,the serious risks posed by the constitutional reform have raised a series of red flags and protests across the country, to the point that the National Association of Circuit Magistrates and District Judges of the Federal Judicial Branch (JUFED) announced the suspension of work for all employees of the Federal Judicial Branch, which began on August 21^st, 2024.

In this regard, the current Federal Judiciary Council, through official communication 18/2024, established that on Monday, September 23^rd, 2024, activities would resume in all jurisdictional bodies of the country; however, representatives of workers, judges and magistrates opposed the resumption of work, leading to official communication 19/2024 which, stipulated that the suspension of work would continue until Wednesday, October 2^nd, 2024. Although the constitutional reform of the Federal Judicial Branch said to aim at improving the efficiency and accessibility of the judicial system, it undeniably presents serious risks that directly challenge fundamental principles and values contained in the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States.  The violation of the principle of division of powers, the threat to judicial independence, and the practical difficulties of implementing certain proposed mechanisms make this reform a matter of concern.

Ricardo Jiram Caro Rocha, Asociado

[email protected]