On July 24, 2026, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”) approved the submission for public consultation of the draft “Lineamientos Generales para la Protección de los Derechos de las Audiencias” (the “Guidelines”), with the purpose of replacing the guidelines published in February 2025. The public consultation was conducted over a period of twenty business days and concluded on August 21, 2026, at 11:59 p.m., for the purpose of obtaining comments from interested stakeholders and members of the public.
The protection of audience rights requires effective mechanisms for receiving and addressing complaints, as well as rules that enable media outlets to establish clear standards concerning their content. The issue arises when, in an effort to strengthen these mechanisms, broad concepts or requirements are introduced that do not necessarily bear a direct relationship to the independence they seek to safeguard.
Two (2) aspects warrant particular attention: the content required for the Codes of Ethics, and the eligibility requirements applicable to the Audience Ombudsperson.
1. Codes of Ethics and the Risk of Indeterminate Concepts. Article 18 of the Guidelines establishes the minimum content that the Codes of Ethics of concessionaires must include. Among other elements, these requirements encompass editorial criteria and values related to the protection of vulnerable groups, non-discrimination, the prohibition of hate speech and violence, human dignity, and the treatment of news information. The provision also requires the Code of Ethics to include the mission and vision defining the media outlet’s editorial identity, as well as “the values and principles that will guide its programming.”
The prohibition of discrimination, for example, is directly supported by the Federal Constitution and by various legal provisions and judicial precedents. The concern arises with respect to concepts whose breadth allows for multiple interpretations, and which may ultimately have regulatory consequences.
A clear example can be found in Article 18, Section IV, which requires concessionaires to establish “the values and principles that will guide their programming” without providing any additional parameters regarding which values should be included, the scope of such values, or the criteria by which a Code of Ethics may be considered to satisfy this requirement.
This issue becomes more significant because a Code of Ethics is not simply a declaratory document. The Guidelines require concessionaires to adopt measures aimed at preventing the dissemination of false or “decontextualized” information and to ensure that the treatment of news information is subject to the editorial criteria and values set forth in their own Codes of Ethics. The difficulty lies in the fact that “decontextualized” is a particularly broad concept that, in the absence of objective parameters, may lend itself to arbitrary interpretations as to the content and scope of a news report, thereby creating a risk of indirect intervention or even censorship.
This concern is further reinforced by the registration procedure established under Article 21. If the Commission determines that a Code of Ethics does not comply with the requirements set forth in Article 18, it may issue a notice requiring the concessionaire to remedy any deficiencies. Additionally, the authority to interpret the Guidelines is vested in the Plenary of the Commission.
The risk does not stem from the protection of audience rights itself. Rather, the concern lies in imposing an obligation whose substantive content remains subject to a subsequent assessment by the regulatory authority.
The Guidelines expressly state that they may not be interpreted in a manner that restricts freedom of expression, programming freedom, editorial freedom, or that would permit prior censorship.
However, a general safeguard clause does not, by itself, eliminate the risks associated with indeterminate concepts. If the values adopted by a concessionaire subsequently become the benchmark for assessing specific content, while the authority retains the power to interpret the Guidelines and supervise compliance with determinations issued in connection with complaint proceedings, the discussion moves beyond the sphere of self-regulation.
The key concern is that regulations based on broadly defined concepts may, in practice, encourage media organizations to adopt more restrictive editorial standards than they would otherwise consider necessary, simply to reduce the risk of future disputes.
The protection of audience rights should not depend on the authority determining which values must guide programming. Instead, it should be based on sufficiently clear rules that allow for the identification of conduct that constitutes a violation of rights already recognized under applicable law.
2. The Audience Ombudsperson: independence and knowledge of the Media Industry. A second area of concern relates to the eligibility requirements for serving as an Audience Ombudsperson. Article 27 establishes, among other requirements, that candidates must be at least thirty years old and possess experience in communications, law, broadcasting, or telecommunications. In addition, individuals who have worked for the concessionaire during the two years preceding their appointment are ineligible to serve in such capacity.
The minimum age requirement is difficult to justify from the standpoint of professional suitability. The draft itself already requires experience in areas directly related to the responsibilities of the position. For example, a twenty-eight-year-old professional with a specialized background in broadcasting or telecommunications law may possess sufficient knowledge and expertise to perform the role effectively. If the objective is to ensure maturity, sound judgment, and independence, age appears to be a relatively weak indicator when compared with factors such as professional experience, specialized training, and the absence of conflicts of interest.
The same regulatory objective could be achieved through requirements directly linked to the functions of the position, without imposing an age threshold that automatically excludes candidates who may otherwise be qualified to perform the role based on their education and experience.
Even more noteworthy is the restriction concerning prior professional experience within the concessionaire itself. Article 27, Section IV, provides that an Audience Ombudsperson may not have worked for the concessionaire during the two years preceding their appointment. Separately, Article 29 establishes additional disqualifications related to family ties, corporate relationships, and, more specifically, having worked for, or served as a legal representative, agent, or authorized representative of, the concessionaire or certain related entities during the preceding two years.
The issue is that both provisions appear to be based on the assumption that prior employment or professional relationships inherently compromise independence. However, not every employment or professional relationship creates a conflict of interest. There is a significant difference between having occupied a position with direct responsibility for editorial decisions and having performed technical, administrative, legal, or other functions unrelated to the outlet’s content. The draft Guidelines treat these situations in essentially the same manner.
By contrast, prior experience within an organization does not necessarily represent a risk. In certain circumstances, it may constitute an advantage, particularly because the Audience Ombudsperson is responsible for resolving complaints regarding content and programming, requesting information from the concessionaire, and evaluating the relevant information necessary to determine whether audience rights have been violated. Such responsibilities require a working understanding of how the media outlet operates, how content is produced, and how its internal processes function.
The relevant concern is not whether the Audience Ombudsperson is familiar with the media organization, but whether the Ombudsperson can exercise independent judgment with respect to the organization.
This issue becomes even more striking in light of another feature of the regulatory framework. Audience Ombudspersons are appointed for three-year terms that may be renewed on up to two occasions, allowing the same individual to remain in the role for as long as nine years within the same concessionaire. If long-term familiarity with the organization is not considered incompatible with independence once the appointment has been made, it becomes difficult to explain why having worked for that same concessionaire in any capacity during the preceding two years should result in an absolute prohibition.
3. Conclusion. The public consultation process provides an opportunity to revisit these issues before the Guidelines are adopted in their final form. The protection of these rights must be balanced against editorial freedom and the need to appoint Audience Ombudspersons who are not only independent, but also possess the expertise and knowledge of the media industry necessary to perform their duties effectively.
In particular, it would be advisable to reassess the scope of the open-ended concepts incorporated into the requirements for Codes of Ethics, as well as the age and prior experience requirements applicable to the Audience Ombudsperson, to ensure that they address actual risks without creating unnecessary restrictions.
The outcome of the public consultation process, and any amendments that the Commission may ultimately decide to incorporate before the final publication of the Guidelines, will need to be assessed once the consultation process concludes. Ideally, the final text will strengthen the protection of audience rights without transforming that protection into an indirect mechanism for conditioning editorial freedom or creating a path toward censorship.
